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Abstract 
This paper develops a model of trade that features heterogeneous firms, technology choice and 
different types of skilled labor in a general equilibrium framework. Its main contribution is to explain 
the impact of trade integration on technology adoption and wage inequalities. It also provides 
empirical evidence to support the model’s predictions using plant-level panel data from Chile’s 
manufacturing sector (1990-1999). The theoretical framework offers a possible explanation of the 
puzzling increase in skill premium in the developing countries. The key mechanism is found in the 
effects of trade policy on the number of new firms upgrading technology and on the skill-intensity of 
labor. Trade liberalization pushes up export revenues, raising the probability that the most productive 
exporters will upgrade their technology. These firms then increase their relative demand for skilled 
labor, thereby raising inequalities. 
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a theoretical model of trade, skill-biased technology adoption and hetero-
geneous firms that reproduces a number of observations described in the empirical literature on
international trade. Recent empirical plant-level studies confirm the existence of heterogeneous
characteristics among firms in the same industry. They demonstrate that exporters are more pro-
ductive, larger, more intensive in skilled labor and pay higher wages than firms selling only to the
domestic market. 1 There is also empirical evidence of growing wage inequalities between skilled
and unskilled labor due to a higher proportion of skilled workers within industries following trade
liberalization. 2
We construct a trade model that links both empirical facts. The skill premium growth in
all industries, even in those unskilled intensive, is explained by the argument of trade-induced
skill-biased technological change in a model with firm heterogeneity. The main contribution to the
existing theoretical literature is to investigate the differentiated impact of trade on firms’ technology
choice and its effect on the evolution of the skill premium in a general equilibrium framework of
heterogeneous firms.
A fixed technology adoption cost and both skilled and unskilled labor are introduced into
Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. His model is based on
the assumption of homogeneous labor. The introduction of different types of skilled labor and
skill-intensity differences between firms enables us to explain the effects of trade integration on
the skill premium. We introduce two sources of cross-plant productivity variation. The first is
an exogenous Hicks-neutral productivity factor, which is drawn from a continuous distribution.
The second is an endogenous skilled-labor-augmenting productivity factor, which is binary. The
high-productivity value of this factor is available to firms that are willing to pay a fixed technology
adoption cost. In this sense, this model can be interpreted as a generalization of Melitz (2003) to
skill-biased productivity.
Trade liberalization changes the scope for profits in the domestic and foreign markets. The
reduction of variable trade costs makes low productivity firms worse off and high productivity
firms better off, as shown by Melitz’s model (”selection effect”). Following the implementation of
trade reforms, the increase in export revenues raises the probability that the most productive low
technology exporters will upgrade their technology. These firms increase their relative demand for
skilled labor, thereby raising the skill premium. The latter effect is beneficial to low-technology
firms compared with high-technology firms. Since the increase in the skill premium is a second
1Roberts and Tybout (1997), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999, 2004) and Aw,
Chung and Roberts (2000) all find that exporters perform better than non-exporters.
2Berman et al., 1998), Maurin, Thesmar and Thoenig (2002), Muendler et al. (2003), Sanchez-Paramo and Schady
(2003), Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), Bustos (2005), Verhoogen (2008).
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order effect, the ”net effect” of reductions in trade frictions on both the extensive margin of trade
and the extensive margin of technology is positive.
In the final section, we provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical predictions based
on plant level panel data from Chile’s manufacturing sector for the period 1990-1999. We test the
following predictions: (1) technology choice is determined by past productivity levels, size and
previous export status, (2) the new high-technology exporters increase their relative demand for
skilled labor, (3) whether trade cost reduction encourages exporters to upgrade their technology
and (4) whether these exporters have a higher relative demand for skilled labor following trade
liberalization.
This paper contributes to a theoretical literature that studies the mechanisms by which trade
policy affects the relative demand for skilled labor and skill premium. Two types of arguments can
be identified, depending on whether they focus mainly on technological change or on the impact of
international trade.3.
The first type of argument is based on skill-biased technological change (SBTC). These models
have been developed mainly by Acemoglu (2003) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003). International
trade prompts innovation and SBTC, thereby raising the relative demand for skilled labor and
hence the skill premium.
On the other hand, recent theoretical studies on international trade focus on the channels
through which trade integration affects the relative demand of skilled labor and the skill premium.
Chun Zhu and Trefler (2005) develop a ricardian model to explain the growth of the skill premium
in developing countries. The main mechanism through which trade raises the relative demand of
skilled labor in developing countries is the technological catch-up of the South.
Based on a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework, Bernard, Redding and Schott (BRS) (2007)
develop a two-sector trade model introducing heterogeneous firms in each sector. The main differ-
ence is that the key mechanism explaining the rise in wage inequalities in our model is based on
the existence of a fixed skill-biased technology cost. Thereby, the level of skill intensity required
by firms is determined by their endogenous decision to upgrade technology, while the level of skill
intensity in the BRS model is exogenously determined.
Some theoretical studies link both arguments: trade-induced skill-biased technological change.
In Ekholm and Midelfart (2005) model trade openness increases the market access of firms, creating
incentives to upgrade skill-intensive technology and raising the skill premium. To investigate the
differentiated effects of trade on firms’ decisions to upgrade technology, our model introduces firms
that are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity gains.
3Some studies focus on outsourcing as the main mechanism explaining the rise in skill premium in industrialized
and developing countries. See Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2000).
3
The model developed in this paper is closely related to Yeaple (2005), who develops a framework
that also takes into account both explanations. He constructs a trade model of ex-ante homogeneous
firms, heterogeneous skills and technology choice.4 Trade reduces the relative fixed costs of high
technology and thus increases the share of skilled labor and the skill premium. Unlike Yeaple
(2005), the firms in our model are heterogeneous even before they start producing and each firm
employs both skilled and unskilled workers. Trade liberalization encourages technology adoption in
unskilled-intensive sectors, thereby raising their skilled labor demand. Another important departure
from Yeaple’s model is that we take into account the effects of the skill premium on firm’s decisions.
Finally, Bustos (2005) expands on Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005) to explain the skill upgrading
prompted by technology adoption that follows the implementation of trade reforms in developing
countries. Using Argentinean firm level data, she finds empirical evidence supporting the argument
of trade-induced skill-biased technological change. Based on a partial equilibrium framework, Bus-
tos (2005) considers neither the firm’s entry-exit process nor the reallocation of resources among
firms or the impact of relative wages on price indexes and other aggregate variables. Moreover,
skilled and unskilled labor are employed in fixed proportions and thereby the skill premium is
exogenous. Therefore, trade policy has no impact on inequalities in that framework.
Conversely, in our model skilled and unskilled labor are combined by a CES production function
and the aggregate relative demand of skilled labor is endogenously determined as well as the skill
premium. Another important difference with Bustos (2005) is that we develop a general equilibrium
framework which takes into account the effects of trade policy on the relative wage of skilled labor
and its impact on aggregate variables and on the selection process into the domestic and foreign
markets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows how the model is set up. Section 3
presents the main theoretical findings and predictions. Section 4 presents the empirical estimations.
Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2 Setup of the model
2.1 Closed economy equilibrium
2.2 Households Consumption
The representative household allocates consumption from among the range of domestic goods (j)
produced using low technology (Ωl) and those produced using more advanced and skill-biased
technology (Ωh). The standard CES utility function (C) represents the consumer preferences. The
4In Yeaple’s model, firm heterogeneity is an endogenous result of the distribution of skilled workers and technology
upgrading.
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elasticity of substitution between low and high technology goods is σ > 1:
C =
(∫
j∈Ωl C
σ−1
σ
lj dj +
∫
j∈Ωh C
σ−1
σ
hj dj
) σ
σ−1
The optimal relative demand functions are:
Ci =
(
P
pi
)σ
C i = {l, h} (1.A)
The subscript ”l” represents firms producing with low technology and ”h” those using high
technology.
2.3 Production
There is a continuum of firms, each producing a different range of goods, in monopolistic compe-
tition. Production requires two different types of labor: unskilled (li) and skilled (hi) inelastically
supplied. Heterogeneous firms with different productivity levels (ϕ) are introduced, in keeping with
Melitz (2003). We adopt a CES production technology that combines skilled and unskilled labor
to produce output.
Yi = ϕ ((ahhi)
α + (li)
α)
1
α i = {l, h} ah = {1, s} s > 1 (2.A)
The coefficient ”ah ” represents the efficiency of high technology, corresponding to skilled labor.
The elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is θ = 11−α . We assume that skilled
and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes, hence 0 < α < 1 and 1 ≤ θ ≤ ∞.
There are three types of fixed costs in a closed economy: (1) a fixed sunk entry cost (fE), that
firms have to pay to enter the market (e.g. costs to develop a blueprint); (2) a fixed per-period
cost (f) that all firms incur, such as that associated with investment in local distribution; and (3)
a fixed per-period technology adoption cost (ft), which represents investment in new and more
advanced skill-biased technology. To make the model tractable, all fixed costs are measured in
units of imported capital and their price is normalized to one. Two groups of domestic firms can
be identified in a closed economy equilibrium: (1) low productivity firms without enough profits
to assume the fixed technology costs (Nl); and (2) the most productive firms, which have acquired
new technology (Nh). The first-order conditions of monopolistic firms is such that prices reflect a
constant markup over marginal cost. Firms face the same demand curve with constant elasticity σ
and they set a markup equal to σσ−1 . In this model, marginal costs can be divided into an intrinsic
productivity term (ϕ) and the unit cost of production (cl or ch), which reflects the ratio of skilled
(wh) to unskilled (wl) wages paid by the firm.
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Low technology firms (Nl) High technology firms (Nh)
pl = σσ−1
cl
ϕi
ph = σσ−1
ch
ϕi
(3.A)
cl =
(
(wl)
α
α−1 + (wh)
α
α−1
)α−1α
ch =
(
(wl)
α
α−1 +
(
wh
ah
) α
α−1
)α−1α
(4.A)
rl =
(
P
pl
)σ−1
R rh =
(
P
ph
)σ−1
R (5.A)
rl = rh
(
ch
cl
)σ−1
rh = rl
(
ch
cl
)1−σ
pil = plYl − wlll − whhl − f pih = phYh − wllh − whhh − f − δft (6.A)
pil = rlσ − f
Goods Market Equilibrium Yi = Ci for i = {l, h} (7.A)
High-technology firms have to pay a fixed technology adoption cost (ft), but have a lower
marginal cost since skill efficiency ”ah > 1” reduces the unit cost (ch). Note that ”ah” is not
heterogeneous, since all firms that upgrade their technology reduce their unit cost by the same
proportion. Even if two firms have the same productivity level, the revenues of the firm using the
more advanced technology are higher than those of the low-technology firm (cl > ch ⇒ rl < rh).
Hence, firms that decide to upgrade technology increase their revenues by
(
ch
cl
)1−σ
. Otherwise,
the firm employs low technology, where ah = 1. The introduction of heterogeneous firms in terms
of productivity levels determines the endogenous technological status of the firms. Only the most
productive firms can switch to high technology and become even more efficient. The term
(
ch
cl
)
represents the relative unit cost of skilled labor and is determined by both the skill premium ω(whwl )
and skill efficiency ”ah”. This relative skilled labor unit cost is an increasing function of the skill
premium
∂
ch
cl
∂ω > 0 since 0 < α < 1 (See Appendix 1).
(
ch
cl
)
=
(
(ω)
α
1−α + 1
(ω)
α
1−α + (ah)
α
1−α
) 1−αα
(8.A)
2.4 Firm’s decisions
2.4.1 The decision to exit or stay and produce
Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost to enter the market before they know what their productivity
level will be. Entrants then derive their productivity ”ϕ” from common distribution density g(ϕ),
with support 0,∞) and cumulative distribution G(α).5 Since there is a fixed production cost (f),
only those firms with enough profits to pay this cost can produce. The profits of the marginal firm
that decides to stay and produce are equal to zero:pil (ϕ∗l ) = 0. The value ϕ
∗
l is the productivity
cutoff to produce.
5These functions are defined in the following section.
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rl (ϕ∗l )
σ
= f ⇒ ϕ∗σ−1l = f cσ−1l
σ
Ψ
Where Ψ = P σ−1R
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(9.A)
2.4.2 The decision to adopt high technology
If a firm decides to stay in the market once it has received its productivity draw, it may also
decide to upgrade its technology to reduce its unit costs on the basis of its profitability. Only a
subset of the most productive firms will switch to high technology since the fixed technology cost is
higher than the fixed production cost. The firms that do will be those whose increase in domestic
revenues due to their adoption of high technology enables them to pay the fixed technology costs.
The condition to acquire the new and more advanced technology is given by: pih(ϕ∗h) = pil(ϕ
∗
h)
[rh(ϕ∗h)− rl(ϕ∗h)]
σ
= δft ⇒ ϕ∗σ−1h =
δft[
c1−σh − c1−σl
] σ
Ψ
(10.A)
ϕ∗h is the minimum productivity level for the marginal firm able to adopt high technology. By
combining equation (9.A) with (10.A), we obtain ϕ∗h as an implicit function of ϕ
∗
l .
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
)σ−1
⇒ ϕ∗h = ϕ∗l
(
δft
f
) 1
σ−1
[(
ch
cl
)1−σ
− 1
] 1
1−σ
(11.A)
To ensure that ϕ∗h > ϕ
∗
l , we have to assume that the amortized value of the fixed technology
cost is much higher than the fixed production cost. The partitioning condition that sustains the
closed economy equilibrium is written:
δft[(
ch
cl
)1−σ − 1] > f (11’.A)
2.5 Aggregation
The distribution of the productivity levels of low- and high-technology firms is represented by µl(ϕ)
and µh(ϕ), respectively. Therefore, µl(ϕ) is the conditional distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ∗l , ϕ
∗
h] while
µh(ϕ) is the conditional distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ∗h,∞) .
µl(ϕ) =
g(ϕ)
G(ϕ∗h)−G(ϕ∗l )
if ϕ∗l < ϕi < ϕ
∗
h (12.A)
µh(ϕ) =
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗h)
if ϕi > ϕ∗h (13.A)
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Where [1−G(ϕ∗l )] and [1−G(ϕ∗h)] represent the ex-ante probability of successful entry and the
ex-ante probability of having a productivity draw higher than ϕ∗h. These distributions define the
weighted averages of the firms’ productivity levels as functions of the cutoffs.
ϕ˜l
σ−1 ≡ 1
G(ϕ∗h)−G(ϕ∗l )
∫ ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
(ϕ)σ−1 g(ϕ)dϕ; ϕ˜hσ−1 ≡ 11−G(ϕ∗h)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗h
(ϕ)σ−1 g(ϕ)dϕ
(14.A 15.A)
ϕ˜h represents the ex-ante weighted average productivity level of high-technology firms before
they decide to adopt the technology. The ex-post productivity average of high-technology firms has
to take into account the increase in the firms’ efficiency due to the acquisition of the more advanced
technology that allows them to reduce their unit costs and raise their market shares by this term(
ch
cl
)1−σ
since rh(ϕ˜h) = rl(ϕ˜h)
(
ch
cl
)1−σ
. Therefore, the weighted average productivity index of the
economy (ϕ˜T ) represents the market shares of all the firms. 6
ϕ˜T
σ−1 =
1
N
[
Nl (ϕ˜l)
σ−1 +Nh
(
ch
cl
)1−σ
(ϕ˜h)
σ−1
]
(16.A)
2.6 Labor Market Equilibrium and the Skill Premium
Both skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across firms in a country.
Although firms have different labor demands depending on their productivity level, all firms pay
the same skilled and unskilled wage. This means that there is a unique skill premium in a country,
which is determined by the aggregate skilled and unskilled labor demands.
Firms’ skilled and unskilled labor demands are determined by profit maximization. By plugging
equation 2.A (production function) into equation 6.A (profit function), the profit maximization
process yields the following relationship between skilled labor, unskilled labor and the skill premium:
hi
li
= ω
1
α−1 (ah)
α
1−α fori = {l, h} ah > 1 if i = h (17.A)
Firms producing with more advanced skill-biased technology will have a higher relative skilled
labor demand than firms using low technology. In monopolistic competition, firms anticipate their
final demand. Plugging equation 17.A into 2.A and then into the goods market equilibrium equation
(7.A) yields the firms’ skilled and unskilled labor demands.
li =
Ci
ϕ
c
1
1−α
i (wl)
1
α−1 for i = {l, h} (18.A)
6The low- and high-technology average productivity levels and the aggregate productivity index define all the
aggregate variables (see Appendix 1).
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hi =
Ci
ϕ
c
1
1−α
i (wh)
1
α−1 (ah)
α
1−α for i = {l, h} (19.A)
Where Ci is the demand for a good produced with low (l) or high (h) technology, and ci is per
unit cost. The overall national demand for unskilled and skilled labor is determined by aggregating
the firms’ individual demands (see Appendix 1).
Ld =
∫ ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
Nlll (ϕ)µl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗h
Nhlh (ϕ)µh(ϕ)dϕ (20.A)
Hd =
∫ ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
Nlhl (ϕ)µl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗h
Nhhh (ϕ)µh(ϕ)dϕ (21.A)
The skill premium (ω) is determined by the equality between aggregate relative skilled labor
demand and supply. H
s
Ls =
Hd
Ld
⇒ ω = g(HsLs , ah, Nl, Nh, fϕheϕl )
Hs
Ls
= ω
1
α−1
1 + (ah)
α
1−α
(
Nh
Nl
)(fϕheϕl )σ−1A
1 +
(
Nh
Nl
)(fϕheϕl )σ−1A
 where A = (ch
cl
)−σ (ω) αα−1 + 1(
ω
ah
) α
α−1 + 1

1
α
(22.A)
2.7 Closed Economy Equilibrium Conditions
Unlike Melitz’s model, the equilibrium productivity cutoff level to produce (ϕ∗l ) depends on the
skill premium, which is determined by equation 22.A. In this model, therefore, the equilibrium
value of ϕ∗l is determined by three conditions: the free entry condition (FE), the zero cutoff profits
condition (ZCP) and the labor market clearing condition (LMC). The value of ϕ∗l at equilibrium
will then pin down the rest of the model’s variables.
The Free Entry Condition (FE): before entering the market and knowing their productivity
level, firms calculate the present value of average profit flows to decide whether to enter the domestic
market. All firms except the marginal firms earn positive profits. Hence, average profit level pi is
positive. As in Melitz (2003), v˜ is the present value of the average profit flows: v˜ =
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t pi
]
and vE is the net value of entry given by: vE = (1−G(ϕ∗l )) v˜ − δfE =
1−G(ϕ∗l )
δ pi − δfE . FE states
that the value of entry is equal to zero.7
FE: vE = 0 ⇒ pi = δfE(
1−G(ϕ∗l )
) (23.A)
7.The factor of discount is modeled following Melitz with a Poisson death shock probability.
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The Zero Cutoff Profit Condition (ZCP): also determines a relation between average
profits and the productivity level of the marginal firm. ρl = 1 − 1−G(ϕ
∗
h)
1−G(ϕ∗l ) and ρh =
1−G(ϕ∗h)
1−G(ϕ∗l )
represent the ex-ante probability of using low and high technology, respectively.
ZCP: pi = ρlpil(ϕ˜l) + ρhpih(ϕ˜h) (24.A)
Assumption 1: Productivity draws are distributed according to a Pareto distribution g (ϕ) =
k(ϕmin)
k
(ϕ)k+1
with a lower bound ϕmin and a shape parameter k (see Appendix 1).
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11’.A), there exists a
unique equilibrium cutoff (ϕ∗l ) determined by ZCP, FE and LMC.
Proof. See Appendix 1 .
ZCP=FE ϕ∗l = f(ah, ω, fE , f, ft, δ)
LMC H
s
Ls =
Hd
Ld
⇒ ω = g(HsLs , ah, f, ft, δ)
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11’.A), ϕ∗l is a
decreasing function of the skill premium but the aggregate relative skilled labor demand does not
depend on ϕ∗l and therefore the skill premium is independent of this cutoff.
8 ∂ϕ
∗
l
∂
ch
cl
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1 .
This implies that an increase in the relative skilled labor unit cost ( chcl ), due to an increase
in the skill premium (
∂
ch
cl
∂ω > 0), reduces the productivity cutoff. Hence, an increase in the skill
premium benefits the least productive unskilled-intensive firms. This cutoff (ϕ∗l ) then determines
the technological cutoff level (ϕ∗h) using equation (11.A).
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11’.A), the techno-
logical cutoff (ϕ∗h) is an increasing function of the relative skilled per unit cost and of the skill
premium. An increase in the relative skill per unit cost reduces the number of firms producing with
high technology skilled biased: ∂ϕ
∗
h
∂
ch
cl
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1 .
The Capital Market Condition: imported capital is required to pay fixed entry costs and
production and technology adoption costs. It is supplied inelastically by the rest of the world
8In the general case, the aggregate relative skilled labor demand depends on the average productivities and thereby
on the cutoffs. There is a unique solution (ω,ϕ∗l ) determined by the intersection between Free Entry-ZCP condition
and the Labor Market Condition. In this case the impact of trade variable costs is ambiguous. Therefore I assume
the Pareto distribution to get an analytical solution of the equilibrium cutoff.
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under the assumption that capital markets operate independently from labor markets.9 Its price
is normalized to one. The capital market clearing condition is10:
K = Nlf +Nh (f + δft) +NEδfE (25.A)
The Global Accounting condition:establishes that the sum of unskilled and skilled revenues
and the capital used to paid fixed costs is equal to the aggregate revenue of the economy (R).
whH + wlL+K = R (26.A)
R = Nr˜ and pi = erσ − f − δftρh. The total number of firms is obtained by using the
average profit to obtain average revenue and plugging it into this condition (eq. 26.A).
N =
whH + wlL+K
(pi + f + δftρh)σ
(27.A)
2.8 Open economy
Countries are symmetric in the open economy equilibrium. Aggregate variables (prices, consump-
tion and revenues) are equivalent in both countries. So there are no differences in the notation of
variables for home and foreign countries. In an open economy equilibrium, there are two different
cases depending on the relation between the fixed technology cost (ft), fixed (fx) and variable trade
costs (τ) and the relative skilled labor unit cost ( chcl ). The first case represents an economy where
fixed technology costs are substantially higher than fixed and variable trade costs. Under these
conditions, there are three groups of firms: (1) the least productive firms selling only on the domes-
tic market and producing with low technology (Ndl); (2) exporters producing with low technology
(Nxl); and (3) the most productive firms capable of exporting and upgrading their technology
(Nxh). In the second case, fixed and variable trade costs are higher than the fixed technology cost.
All exporters produce with high technology and there are two different types of domestic firms.
Since the Chile data patterns fit the first case better (see Section 4), we only derive the equilibrium
for this case.11
9If we assume that fixed costs are paid with skilled and unskilled labor, this will complicate the calculation and
the skilled premium will be a function of the production productivity cutoff.
10The number of firms producing with low technology (Nl = ρlN), those producing with high technology (Nh =
ρhN) and the number of new entrants (NE =
δN
1−G(ϕ∗
l
)
) are determined by the total number of firms and the
probabilities which depend on productivity cutoff levels.
11The derivation of the second open economy equilibrium is available in the author’s PhD dissertation.
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2.9 Set-up of the open economy equilibrium
2.10 Households Consumption
Goods produced by domestic firms can be traded or not and produced using low or high technology
depending on the firm’s profitability. The representative household allocates consumption from
among a set of domestic goods produced with low technology (Ωdl) and two different sets of foreign
imported varieties produced with low (Ωxl) and high technology (Ωxh). Consumers preferences are
represented by the standard C.E.S. utility function:
C =
(∫
j∈Ωdl C
σ−1
σ
dl dj +
∫
j∈Ωxl C
σ−1
σ
xl dj +
∫
j∈Ωxh C
σ−1
σ
xh dj
) σ
σ−1
The optimal relative demand functions are:
Ci =
(
P
pi
)σ
C fori = {dl, xl, xh} (1.B)
The subscript ”dl” represents varieties produced by low technology firms selling on the domestic
market, ”xl” those using low technology and selling on the foreign markets and ”xh” exporters
producing with high technology.
2.11 Production
Similar to the closed economy equilibrium, the production function using skilled and unskilled labor
is represented by a CES function given by:
Yi = ϕ ((ahhi)
α + (li)
α)
1
α for i = {dl, xl, xh} (2.B)
Only the most productive exporters will be able to switch to high technology. Since high
technology is skilled biased, the firms that acquire this technology will have greater skilled labor
efficiency (ah > 1) and a lower marginal cost (ch < cl). More productive firms have lower unit costs
and are thereby able to set lower prices and have higher revenues as well as greater profits.
1.Non exporters - Low Technology (Ndl)
(3.B) pdl = σσ−1
cl
ϕi
(5.B) rdl =
(
P
pdl
)σ−1
R
(4.B) cl =
(
(wl)
α
α−1 + (wh)
α
α−1
)α−1α
(6.B) pidl = pdlYdl − wlldl − whhdl − f = rdlσ − f
2.Exporters - Low Technology (Nxl) 3. Exporters - High Technology (Nxh)
pxl = pdl (1 + τ) rxh =
(
P
pdh(1+τ)
)σ−1
R
rxl =
(
P
pdl(1+τ)
)σ−1
R rdh + rxh = rdh
[
1 + (1 + τ)1−σ
]
pidl + pixl =
rdl[1+(1+τ)1−σ]
σ − f − δfx pidh + pixh =
rdh[1+(1+τ)1−σ]
σ − f − δfx − δft
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Goods Market Equilibrium Ci = Yi for i = {dl, dh} ; Ci = Yi(1 + τ) for i = {xl, xh}
(7.B)
Given that unit costs (cl, ch) are independent of productivity levels, note that equation (4.B) in
the open economy scenario is identical to (4.A). The relative unit costs remain unchanged (equation
8.B = 8.A).
2.12 Firm’s decisions
2.12.1 Production and Export decision
Both the decision to enter the market and to produce remain unchanged relatively to the closed
economy equilibrium:
pidl (ϕ∗dl) = 0 ⇒
rdl (ϕ∗dl)
σ
= f ⇒ ϕ∗σ−1dl = f cσ−1l
σ
Ψ
(9.B)
The tradability condition implies that only firms with operating profits that offset the amortized
fixed export cost per period (δfx) will be able to export. The zero cutoff profits condition to enter
the export market is given by:
pixl (ϕ∗xl) = 0 ⇒
rxl
σ
= δfx ⇒ ϕ∗σ−1xl = δfx (1 + τ)σ−1 cσ−1l
σ
Ψ
(10.1.B)
Where ϕ∗xl corresponds to the productivity level of the marginal firm able to enter the foreign
market. Combining (9.B) and (10.1.B) leads to the definition of ϕ∗xl as an implicit function of ϕ
∗
dl :
rxl (ϕ∗xl)
rdl
(
ϕ∗dl
) = δfx
f
⇒ ϕ∗xl = ϕ∗dl
(
δfx
f
) 1
σ−1
(1 + τ) (11.1.B)
2.12.2 The decision to adopt High Technology
Given that, in this case, the fixed technology costs are higher than the trade costs, a firm will
never find it profitable to switch to high technology and decide not to export. Therefore, only a
subset of exporters will upgrade to high technology. They will be those exporters whose increase
in domestic and export sales due to their adoption of high technology will enable them to pay the
fixed technology costs. This condition is given by: pidh(ϕ∗xh)+ pixh(ϕ
∗
xh) = pidl(ϕ
∗
xh)+pixl(ϕ
∗
xh)
13
[rdh(ϕ∗xh) + rxh(ϕ
∗
xh)]− [rdl(ϕ∗xh) + rxl(ϕ∗xh)]
σ
= δft ⇒ ϕ∗σ−1xh =
δft[
1 + (1 + τ)1−σ
] [
c1−σh − c1−σl
] σΨ
(10.2.B)
The productivity cutoff to acquire high technology is represented by ϕ∗xh. The value of ϕ
∗
xh as a
function of ϕ∗dl is given by (9.B) and (10.2.B):
ϕ∗xh = ϕ
∗
dl
(
δft
f
) 1
σ−1
[[(
ch
cl
)1−σ
− 1
] [
1 + (1 + τ)1−σ
]] 11−σ
(11.2.B)
The specific condition for the partitioning of firms by export and technology status, which
ensures that ϕ∗xh > ϕ
∗
xl > ϕ
∗
dl is:
δft[
1 + (1 + τ)1−σ
] [(
ch
cl
)1−σ − 1] > (1 + τ)σ−1 δfx > f (11’.B)
This condition establishes that adopting high technology is more expensive than exporting
and thereby suggests that only the most productive exporters can upgrade their technology. The
weighted productivity average of each group of firms (ϕ˜dl, ϕ˜xl, ϕ˜xh) is defined using the same type
of weighted average function defined in equations 12.A -16.A (Appendix 2 details the aggregation).
2.13 Labor Market Equilibrium and the Skill Premium in the Open Economy
In the open economy equilibrium, exporters producing with low and high technology will increase
their skilled and unskilled labor demand to produce for the foreign market. These demands are
determined similarly to (18.A) and (19.A), taking into account the domestic demand for final
goods (Cdl, Cdh) and the exporting firms’ foreign demand for final goods (Cxl, Cxh). Equation 17.A
remains unchanged (17.A=17.B).
lxi =
[Cxi + Cdi]
ϕ
c
1
1−α
i (wl)
1
α−1 (18.B)
hxi =
[Cxi + Cdi]
ϕ
c
1
1−α
i (wh)
1
α−1 (ah)
α
1−α Where i = {l, h} ah > 1 ifi = h (19.B)
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Like (20.A) and (21.A), the overall national demand for unskilled and skilled labor is determined
by aggregating the firms’ individual demands. Here, we have to take into account firms producing
in the domestic market and both types of exporting firms.
Ld =
∫ ϕ∗xl
ϕ∗dl
Ndlldl (ϕ)µdl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ∗xh
ϕ∗xl
Nxllxl (ϕ)µxl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗xh
Nxhlxh (ϕ)µxh(ϕ)dϕ (20.B)
Hd =
∫ ϕ∗xl
ϕ∗dl
Ndlhdl (ϕ)µdl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ϕ∗xh
ϕ∗xl
Nxlhxl (ϕ)µxl(ϕ)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗xh
Nxhhxh (ϕ)µxh(ϕ)dϕ (21.B)
The aggregate relative skilled labor supply and demand jointly determine the skill premium (see
Appendix 2 for a presentation of the aggregate demands).
Hs
Ls
=
Hd
Ld
⇒ ω = g(H
s
Ls
, ah, Ndl, Nxl, Nxh,ϕ˜dl, ϕ˜xl, ϕ˜xh) (22.B)
2.14 Open Economy Equilibrium Conditions
As in the closed economy equilibrium, we obtain an analytical solution for the productivity, tech-
nological and export cutoffs using a Pareto distribution of productivity draws (see Appendix 2).
The equilibrium level of the productivity cutoff is determined by the FE, the new ZCP and LMC
conditions, just as in the closed economy equilibrium. FE remains unchanged. Under the ZCP
condition for the open economy equilibrium, we have to take into account the average profits of
low- and high-technology exporters.12
FE: pi =
δfE(
1−G(ϕ∗dl)
) (23.B)
ZCP:pi = pidl(ϕ˜dl)ρdl + ρxl [pidl(ϕ˜xl) + pixl(ϕ˜xl)] + ρxh [pidh(ϕ˜xh) + pixh(ϕ˜xh)] (24.B)
ZCP=FE ϕ∗dl = f(ah, ω, fE , f, fx, ft, τ, δ)
LMC H
s
Ls =
Hd
Ld
⇒ ω = g(HsLs , ah, f, τ, fx, ft, δ)
Similar to the closed economy, under pareto distribution of productivity draws the skill premium
is independent of the productivity cutoff (ϕ∗dl). It is determined by the parameters of the model.
Proposition 4: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq.
11’.B), there exists a unique costly trade equilibrium cutoff (ϕ∗dl).
12The variables ”ρl, ρxh, ρxl, ρx” represent the probabilities of being a low technology firm (ρl), an exporting high
technology firm (ρxh), an exporting low technology firm (ρxl) and finally an exporting firm (ρx)(See Appendix 2).
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Proof. See Appendix 2. 
Capital Market and Global Accounting Conditions: 13
K = Ndlf +Nxl (f + δfx) +Nxh (f + δfx + δft) +NEfE (25.B)
whH + wlL+K = R (26.B)
N =
whH + wlL+K
[pi + f + δfxρxl + (δfx + δft) ρxh]σ
(27.B)
3 The model’s findings and predictions
3.1 The impact of trade liberalization
This section looks at the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ decisions. In order to analyze the
impact of trade on firms’ decision to produce we compare the productivity cutoff of the marginal
firm in the open economy equilibrium, as determined by equation 28.B, to its autarky level, as
determined by equation 28.A. This cutoff is determined by the free entry condition and the zero
cutoff profit condition (ZCP). The free entry condition remains unchanged, but the ZCP is higher in
the open economy equilibrium. Indeed, trade liberalization induces an increase in the productivity
cutoff level of the marginal firm. This is the selection effect in the domestic market, as presented
by Melitz (2003). When the economy opens up to trade, the entry of the most productive foreign
exporters onto the domestic market reduces all the firms’ domestic profits, prompting the exit of
the least productive firms.
Proposition 5: Comparing the productivity cutoff of the open economy ϕ∗dl, as determined in
equation 28.B, to its autarky level ϕ∗l , as determined in equation 28.A, we can prove that trade
liberalization leads to a higher productivity cutoff.
Proof. See Appendix 2 .
This model sets out to introduce yet another channel based on the effects of trade on the
extensive margin of technology adoption. Trade integration raises expected export profits and
has a positive impact on both the extensive margin of trade (the number of new exporters) and
of technology adoption (the number of new firms upgrading technology). The increase in export
profitability induced by trade liberalization creates incentives to upgrade technology.
13Both conditions have to take into account trade costs.
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Proposition 6: Average profits of high technology exporters increase with a reduction of trade
variable costs, for a given level of the skill premium.
Proof. See Appendix 2 .
Therefore, the most productive low-technology exporters adopt high technology and raise their
relative demand for skilled labor. Trade liberalization increases the number of firms using high
technology skilled bias and thereby, raises the aggregate relative demand of skilled labor and in-
equalities between skilled and unskilled labor.
Proposition 7: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq.
11’.B), both the aggregate relative demand of skilled labor and thereby the skill premium are de-
creasing functions of trade variable costs:
∂(HL )
d
∂τ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2 .
The last trade liberalization channel is the skill premium effect. In the general equilibrium, an
upturn in the skill premium has a different impact on firms’ decisions depending on their intensity in
skilled and unskilled labor. However, this is an effect stemming from the increase in the extensive
margin of technology induced by selection. The low-technology unskilled-intensive firms benefit
from the reduction in the relative unskilled labor wage (skill premium appreciation) compared
with the most productive, skilled-intensive workers. Opposite forces affect both the production
and technology productivity cutoff: (1) the domestic and export selection effect, and (2) the skill
premium effect. In order to determine which effect dominates, I run simulations of the impact
of trade variable costs reduction on the equilibrium productivity cutoff taking into account the
variations of the skill premium (See Appendix 2 and 3). Under the specific partitioning condition,
the effects of trade reforms are quite unambiguous. Given that the increase in skill premium is a
second-order effect, the net effect of trade reforms on the productivity cutoff is negative (Graph 1
in Appendix 3). The impact of variable trade costs is unambiguous and positive for the extensive
margin of trade. New unskilled-intensive firms find it profitable to start exporting. Lastly, the net
effect of trade liberalization on the extensive margin of technology is also positive. The increase in
export profitability offsets the increase in the skill premium (Graph 2).
3.2 Testable predictions
The results analyzed in the previous section yield a set of testable predictions concerning the
determinants of technology choice and the relative demand of skilled labor, and the differentiated
impact of trade integration on firms’ decisions. Compared to a model of homogeneous firms, this
model predicts that:
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Testable prediction 1: Only the most productive and larger exporters are able to
upgrade technology.
In the theoretical framework the probability that a firm with productivity ϕ upgrades technology
is determined by:
P (TECHit > 0) = [[rdh(ϕ∗xh) + rxh(ϕ
∗
xh)]− [rdl(ϕ∗xh) + rxl(ϕ∗xh)] > ftσ]
This probability is an increasing function of ϕ. This prediction is tested by estimating the
determinants of the probability that firm i adopts foreign technology at time t, using the following
reduced form:
(I) Prob(TECHit > 0) = 1
if α1 + α2TFPi(t−1) + α3Sizei(t−1) + α4Zi(t−1) + υt + µi + it > 0
Where TECHit is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i uses high technology, TFPi(t−1)
is the log of plant total factor productivity in the previous year, Size
i(t−1)
is the log of plant total
employment in the previous year; and Z
i(t−1) is a vector of control variables of plant character-
istics such as capital intensity (the log of capital stock over total employment), an indicator of
foreign status (FDI)14 and a financial indicator, which identifies plants that do not face credit
constraints.15 In order to address the potential simultaneity problems between technology choice
and firms’ observable characteristics, we lag all control variables one year. This strategy is similar
to previous works on the probability of exporting developed by Bernard and Jensen (2004). it
is an unobserved component. We introduce year fixed effects (υt) to control for macroeconomic
shocks and specific plant fixed effects (µi) to control for the unobservable plant characteristics. In
the specifications without plant fixed effects we also control by industry indicators at the 3-digit
industry level.
Testable prediction 2: Only those firms that have adopted the high technology
increase their relative demand for skilled labor.
This prediction is directly derived from the assumption that high technology is skilled bias.
Firms that upgrade technology have a larger relative demand for skilled labor:
hi
li
= ω
1
α−1 (ah)
α
1−α ah > 1 if the firm upgrades technology.
14To control for the presence of multinational firms, a dummy variable equal to one is introduced when the
percentage of foreign capital is higher than 50% (FDI indicator).
15”Credit” is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant reports having paid a loan tax in year ”t” indicating that
they are not subject to financial constraints. Industry affiliation (three-digit ISIC level) and year dummies are also
introduced.
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This prediction is tested by estimating a model in first differences in order to investigate whether
those exporters that have adopted the high technology upgrade skilled labor. We estimate the
following model:
(II)∆ ln
(
Hit
Lit
)
= β1+β2∆Exporter TECHit+β3∆Exporter Onlyit+β4∆TECH non exporterit+
β5∆Zit + υt + µi +∆eit
The dependant variable is the number of skilled workers over unskilled workers
(
Hit
Lit
)
. Ex-
porter TECH is an interaction term between export and technology status. It is a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the firm i exports and also switchs to foreign-high technology in time t.
Exporter Only is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i exports but does not adopt high
technology. TECH non exporter is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm uses high technol-
ogy but does not export. The omitted category corresponds to non exporters that do not upgrade
technology. Therefore, all results are interpreted relative to these firms selling only in the domestic
market and producing with low technology. Zit is a vector of control variables of plant charac-
teristics (plant TFP, capital intensity, credit, foreign status). eit is an unobserved component. We
introduce year fixed effects (υt) to control for macroeconomic shocks and specific plant fixed effects
(µi) to control for the unobservable plant characteristics. In the specifications without plant fixed
effects we also control by industry indicators at the 3-digit industry level.
Testable prediction 3: A reduction in variable trade costs encourages only those
firms who are already exporters to upgrade their technology.
We test the impact of changes in trade variable costs on the probability of adopting foreign
technology using the following linear probability model with plant fixed effects:
(III.A) Prob(TECHit > 0) = 1
if γ1 + γ2∆TXs + γ3TFP
i(t−1)
+ γ4Size
i(t−1)
+ γ5Zi(t−1) + υt + µi + it > 0
Where TECHit is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i uses foreign technology at time
t, TX is the export barrier, which varies across time. Similar to previous regressions we control
for plant observable characteristics in the previous year, time indicators (υt) and plant fixed effects
(µi).
As a robustness check, we also test this prediction by estimating the impact of a reduction in
export barriers on the evolution in foreign technology spending for different export status using the
following framework:
(III.B) lnTECH Sit = δ1+δ2(Exporti)+δ3(TXst)+δ4(TXst∗Exporti)+δcZit+υt+ηs+it
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Where TECH Sit is foreign technology spending; export is a vector of the dummy variables
indicating the export status of the plants (always, starter, switcher, stopper)16; and Zit is a vector
of the control variables.17 υt are time fixed effects and ηs 3-digit industry fixed effects. The omitted
categories are non-exporters, the year 1990 and sector 390 (other industries).
Testable prediction 4: After a fall in variable trade costs, only the new high-
technology exporters increase their relative demand for skilled labor.
In order to test this prediction, we first estimate the impact of a change in trade variable costs
on a change in the relative demand of skilled labor in the full sample and also in the subsample of
high-technology exporters:
(IV.A) ∆ ln
(
Hit
Lit
)
= χ1 + χ2∆TXst + χ3∆Zit + υt + ηs +∆eit
The dependant variable is the number of skilled workers over unskilled workers
(
Hit
Lit
)
, TX is
the export barrier and and Zit is a vector of the control variables. υt are time fixed effects and ηs
3-digit industry fixed effects.
Similar to the previous prediction, as a robustness check, we estimate the effect of a reduction
in variable trade costs on the relative demand for skilled labor by firm export status using the
following specification with interaction terms between trade barriers and export status:
(IV.B) ln
(
Hit
Lit
)
= λ1+λ2(Exporti)+λ3(TXst)+λ4(TXst ∗Exporti)+λ5Zit+υt+ηs+ eit
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Data and descriptive analysis
This section provides some evidence in support of the theoretical predictions. This evidence draws
on a database of Chilean plants provided by the ENIA Survey, a comprehensive manufacturing
census covering all plants with more than 10 employees from 1979 to 1999. The data used covers
value-added, investment in new capital equipment, foreign technology assistance (FTA),imported
inputs, expenditures on patent use and skilled and unskilled labor, and the share of skilled and
unskilled labor in the wage bill. Export sales are reported from 1990 onwards. The plants’ TFP
was estimated as a residual of factor contributions (capital, skilled and unskilled labor) by Bas
16Always is a firm that exports in all years of the period, starter is the firm that becomes an exporter during the
period and does not reswitch, switcher is the one that changes its export status more than once and stopper is the
one that exits the export market during the period.
17The control variables are plant size (measured by staff numbers in the initial year), capital intensity in the initial
year, an foreing status indicator and one of the credit constraints. Industry affiliation (three-digit ISIC level) and
year dummies are also introduced.
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and Ledezma (2007) based on the semi-parametric estimations by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).18
Given that Chile is a developing country highly dependent on imported capital equipment and
intermediate inputs, we consider that the most appropriate proxies for high technology are for-
eign technology measures. This measure comprises expenditure on foreign technological assistance
(FTA) similar to Pavcnik (2003). Those firms that report expenditures on FTA are considered as
firms with access to foreign technology. As a robustness check we use alternative technology mea-
sures such as expenditures on patent use and investment in new machinery. Table 10 (Appendix
4) summarizes the variables and data requirements.
We use as a measure of variable trade costs faced by Chilean exporters an average of import
tariffs on chilean exports at the three-digit industry level (1991-1999) set by Chile’s main Latin
American trading partners. This data draws on the Trade and Production Database (World Bank
and CEPII). The reduction of average import tariff is 8% in the period.19
Table 11 (Appendix 4) summarizes the firms’ main characteristics (3,900 plants per year).
Exporters (31%) are larger20, more productive (higher TFP) and more skilled and capital intensive.
The proportion of exporters using FTA, investing on new machinery, using patent rights and
imported inputs is much higher than the percentage of non-exporters. The features of the open
economy equilibrium described in the previous section fit the descriptive evidence for the case of
Chile. In order to test the assumption of heterogeneous firms in terms of productivity levels, we
estimate the export premia. As in Bernard and Jensen (2004) we classified export status in 5
firm export types (always, starter, switcher, stopper and never exporters) in order to test their
impact on plants’ TFP .Table 12 (Appendix 4) reports on these findings. The omitted category
corresponds to those firms that never export. Once we have controlled for initial size, foreign status
and financial constraint indicators (column 4), only continuing, new exporters and switchers are
more productive than those firms that sell solely on the domestic market. Among the exporters,
the most productive are those that exported throughout the entire period. Continuing exporters
are 28% more productive than non-exporters, while new exporters and switchers are 17% more
productive (column 4). Those firms using foreign technology are more productive (31%) than the
ones using domestic technology (column 5).
Our analysis of growth in the relative skilled labor demand and skill premium uses the de-
composition approach developed by Machin and Van Reenen (1998) (Tables 13 and 14 Appendix
4). From 1979 to 1999, the relative demand for skilled labor rose 20% at the three-digit industry
level. This increase is entirely explained by the within-industry variation. The between indicator is
18Several specific sector-level deflators (Isic-3dig Rev2 1992) are applied to value-added, technological measures,
materials and investment.
19The Latin American countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
20Size classification: large firms have more than 150 workers, medium firms have more than 50 and up to 149
workers and small firms have more than 10 and up to 49.
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negative and extremely small. 21 During the debt crisis (1979-1986), skill intensity rose to 37% at
the two-digit industry level. A full 26% of this increase is explained by the within estimator, while
only 11% is explained by the between indicator. In the 1990s, there was also a rise in the relative
demand for skilled labor, which is entirely explained by the within estimator. Similar findings hold
for relative skilled wages in all periods.
4.2 Testing the predictions of the model
Prediction 1: Technology choice determinants
The model’s first prediction concerns the determinants of technology choice. The model predicts
that only the most productive and larger exporters upgrade technology. Table 1 presents the
results of the estimation of equation (I) using foreign technological assistance (FTA) as a proxy of
technology adoption for the subsample of firms that export in the period. Column 1 reports the
results on logit estimations with year and industry fixed effects and column 2 presents the results
on conditional Logit estimations with plant fixed effects. Since there is bias in the coefficients
of conditional Logit estimations with plant fixed effects, as a robustness check columns 3 to 4
present the results of the linear probability model. As expected the coefficients of the linear
probability model are smaller than those of the conditional logit. Once we control for observable
plant characteristics, using the linear probability model (column 3), productivity increases the
probability of upgrading technology of 3%, size (employment) of 7%, capital intensity and financial
access of 2% and foreign status (FDI) of 10%. Once we control by observed and unobserved plant
characteristics (column 2 and 4), in both specifications, the main determinant of foreign technology
choice is total factor productivity in the previous year.
[Table 1 about here]
As a robustness check we use alternative technology measures. Columns 1 and 2 of table 2
show the results using as a dependant variable a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i reports
expenditures on patent use at time t. Under the linear probability model with plant fixed effects,
size raises the probability that exporters upgrade technology (patent use) of 5%, plant TFP of
2% and the access to credit 4% (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 report the results using
as a dependant variable a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i invests in new machinery at
time t as a proxy of technology choice. Under the linear probability model with plant fixed effects,
size raises the probability that exporters invest in new machinery of 7%, plant TFP of almost 5%
(column 4).
21Similar results hold at 2 digit industry level and at the firm level.
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[Table 2 about here]
To conclude, we find robust empirical evidence supporting the first prediction of the model.
This evidence shows that plant productivity and size are the main determinants of technology
choice for those firms that are engaged in the export market.
Prediction 2: New high-technology exporters increase their relative demand for
skilled labor
The model also predicts that those firms that have adopted the high technology increase their
relative demand of skilled labor since technology is skilled-biased. This prediction is tested by
estimating equation (II) using a model in first differences. Table 3 reports the results using foreign
technological assistance (FTA) as a proxy of technology adoption. The coefficient of interest is β2.
It measures the impact of those exporters using low technology at time t-1 who switch to high
technology at time t, on changes in skill upgrading from time t-1 to t relative to non exporters that
do not upgrade technology. This coefficient is positive and significant indicating that exporters
who adopt foreign technology are more skilled intensive than firms selling on the domestic market
and producing with low technology. However, the coefficient of Exporter Only indicator is positive
but not significant once we control for plant fixed effects (column 5) . As predicted by the model,
those exporters that have not switched to high technology will not upgrade skill since they are
unskilled intensive. Finally, as predicted by the model the coefficient of TECH non exporter is
not significant in all specifications.
In the first column we control for changes on plant TFP and in the second one for changes on
capital intensity. As expected an increase in productivity levels as well as in capital intensity raise
the relative skilled labor demand. Those firms that do not face credit constraint also upgrade skills
(column 3). The change on foreign status is not significant (column 4). In the last column we
introduce plant fixed effects. Once we control for plant unobservable characteristics, the coefficient
of Exporter TECH indicator is still positive and significant, while the coefficient of Exporter Only
is not significant. Therefore, only exporters that upgrade technology will increase their relative
demand of skilled labor.
[Table 3 about here]
As a robustness check, we test the impact of patent use and investment in new machinery on
skill upgrading. Table 4 reports the results using patent indicator as an alternative measure of
technology adoption. Columns 1 to 3 show the results once we control by year and industry fixed
effects for the full sample (column 1), the subsample of never exporters (column 2) and those of
exporters (column 3). Columns 4 to 6 report the results controlling by plant fixed effects. Once
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we control for the unobservable plant characteristics, the impact of patent indicator on the relative
demand of skilled labor is positive and significant only for the full sample and the subsample of
exporters. Table 5 shows the results using investment in new machinery indicator. In this case,
the impact of technology on the growth of the relative demand of skilled labor is only positive and
significant in the case of exporters.
This evidence confirms that only exporters that upgrade technology increase their relative
demand of skilled labor as it is predicted by the model.
[Table 4 and 5 about here]
Prediction 3: The impact of trade liberalization on technology adoption
One of the model’s prediction concerns the impact of trade liberalization on the extensive
margin of technology adoption. A reduction in variable trade costs encourages some exporters to
switch to more advanced technology. This prediction is tested using a linear probability model
with plant fixed effects. Table 6 reports estimations of equation (III.A). The model predicts a
negative coefficient (γ2) of the change in export barriers indicating that a reduction of trade frictions
increases the probability of upgrading technology. Columns 1 to 4 report the results for the full
sample. Once we control for observable and unobservable plant characteristics, the reduction of
tariffs has a positive effect on the probability of adopting high technology (-0.189). In the last
column we run the same regression on the sample of those firms that export during the whole
period (1990-1999) or those that start exporting. In this case, the impact of tariff reductions on
technology choice is larger since the coefficient of the change in tariffs is much higher (-0.537).
[Table 6 about here]
As a robustness check, we also test this prediction by estimating equation (III.B). This equation
disentangles the growth in foreign technology expenditure due to changes in trade costs depending
on the export status of the firm. We are mainly interested in the estimates of the vector coefficient
δ4. These are the coefficients of the interaction terms between export barriers and export status. A
negative and significant coefficient is expected, meaning that a reduction in trade costs triggers a
greater increase in foreign technology expenditure by exporters compared with non-exporters. The
results of the estimation of equation (III.B) by OLS with standard errors clustered at plant level
are presented in Table 7. In columns 2 to 5, we control by initial plant TFP and capital intensity,
foreign status and financial indicator (credit) in the previous year. However, after controlling by
means of these alternative explanations the coefficients of the interaction term between continuing
exporters (Always) and average tariffs is still negative and significant. Within the same industry,
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continuing exporters have a higher level of foreign technology than non-exporters after a reduction
in trade barriers. Since the average reduction of the average import tariff is 7%, compared with
non-exporters, continuing exporters raise their foreign technology expenditure from a range of 7%.
[Table 7 about here]
Prediction 4: The impact of trade liberalization on the relative skilled labor demand
Finally, this model predicts that, after trade liberalization, exporters producing with high tech-
nology will raise their relative demand for skilled labor. Since more advanced technology is com-
plementary with skilled labor, exporters that upgrade technology following trade reform will also
upgrade skilled labor.
We estimate equation (IV.A), columns 1 to 4 in table 8 present the results of these estimations
for the full sample. After controlling for changes in plant productivity, capital intensity, foreign
and financial status, a reduction in tariffs has a significant and positive effect on the growth of
the relative demand of skilled labor (column 4). In the last column we report the results for the
subsample of those continuing exporters that have adopted high technology during the period. In
this case the positive impact of tariff cut on skill upgrading is much higher. Trade liberalization
induces a raise in the relative demand of skilled labor of high technology exporters of 17% log
points.
[Table 8 about here]
As a robustness check, table 9 reports the estimations of equation (IV.B) by OLS with Huber
White standard errors clustered at plant level. After controlling for the plant’s initial productivity,
capital intensity and foreign status, differences in skill upgrading between continuing exporters
and firms selling only on the domestic market increase as export barriers decrease. The trade-
liberalization-induced increase in the relative demand for skilled labor by continuing exporters
compared with non-exporters ranges from 2%.
[Table 9 about here]
5 Conclusions
This paper explores the changes in the extensive margin of technology adoption and its effect
on wage inequalities following trade liberalization. The mechanism is based on the impact of
the technology-upgrading decision on the relative demand for skilled labor and hence on the skill
premium. In terms of policy implications, a reduction in variable trade costs raises the number
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of firms selling abroad and encourages the most productive firms to switch to high technology.
This enhances the relative demand for skilled labor and boosts the skill premium. The main
contribution of this paper to the existing literature is to propose a general equilibrium model that
links trade, firms’ technology choice and wage inequalities in a framework of heterogeneous firms.
This theoretical framework also explains the extensive empirical evidence: firms selling on foreign
markets are not only more productive, but also use modern technologies and are more skill-intensive
than firms selling only on the domestic markets. We provide evidence in support of the model’s
key predictions, drawing on plant level panel data for Chile’s manufacturing sector.
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6 Appendix 1: closed economy equilibrium
The relative skill per unit cost is an increasing function of the skill premium (equation 8.A):
∂
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) 1−α
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Aggregation. Using price rule (eq. 3.A) and plugging it into the aggregate price index yields:
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(
σ
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Averages productivities assuming Pareto distribution. Similar to Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), we assume that productivity draws are distributed according to a Pareto distribution g (ϕ) =
k(ϕmin)
k
(ϕ)k+1
with a lower bound ϕmin and a shape parameter k indexing the dispersion of productivity
levels among firms. Since we assume that ϕmin = 1 and the condition that ensures a finite mean of
firm size is k > σ − 1. The cumulative distribution function is G(ϕi) = 1−
(
ϕmin
ϕi
)k
.
Average productivity of low technology firms
ϕ˜l ≡ υϕ∗l
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Average productivity of high technology firms ϕ˜h ≡ υϕ∗h if ϕ > ϕ∗h
Determination of probabilities: ρl = 1− 1−G(ϕ
∗
h)
1−G(ϕ∗l ) = 1−
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1−G(ϕ∗l ) =
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Labor Market Condition: Plugging firms’ final good demands (1.A) into (18.A) and (19.A)
and using (4.A) to express cl, ch, firms’ demand of skilled (hl, hh) and unskilled labor is:
li =
(
P
pi
)σ
C
ϕ
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ω
ah
) α
α−1
+ 1
)− 1α
(18.A’)
; hi =
(
P
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)σ
C
ϕah
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)− 1α
(19.A’)
Where i = {l, h} ah > 1 if i = h
Plugging firms’ prices (3.A) into (18.A’) and (19.A’) and then into aggregate skilled and un-
skilled labor demands using (20.A) and (21.A), we obtain the aggregate relative demand for skilled
labor (22.A).
Proof of Proposition 1: Determination of closed economy equilibrium.
Proof. LMC (22.A), FE (23.A) and ZCP (24.A) conditions jointly determine the equilibrium
cutoff level (ϕ∗l ). In order to obtain this cutoff, we plug into eq. 24.A the averages productivities,
the technology cutoff (eq. 11.A) and the probabilities using assumption 1 and we obtain:
ϕ∗kla δfE = f
[
(υ)σ−1 − 1
]
+
[[(
ch
cl
)1−σ − 1] kσ−1 ft (ftf ) k1−σ [(υ)σ−1 − 1]
]
(28.A)
Since the relative skilled labor unit cost
(
ch
cl
)
depends on the skill premium, equations 28.A
and 22.A (LMC) determine the equilibrium production cutoff.
Proof of Proposition 2: We partially differentiate equation 28.A with respect to chcl (ω) ,
in order to analyze the impact of an exogenous increase in the skill premium on the productivity
cutoff. Partially differentiating (28.A) we find ∂ϕ
∗
l
∂
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< 0 .
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> 1 and (υ)σ−1 > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: Partially differenciating (11.A) with respect to chcl (ω), we find
∂ϕ∗h
∂
ch
cl
(ω)
= ϕ
∗
h
ϕ∗l
[
∂ϕ∗l
∂
“
ch
cl
” + ϕ∗l
[(
ch
cl
)1−σ − 1]−1 ( chcl )−σ
]
> 0 (30.A)
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We can demostrate that ∂ϕ
∗
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into (30.A), the term in brakets in (30.A) can be expressed as follows:
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> 0. This result holds since fδfE > 0 and (υ)
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7 Appendix 2: Open Economy Equilibrium
Averages productivities assuming Pareto distribution.
µdl(ϕ) =
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Average productivity of low technology firms (non exporters and exporters) in the
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Average productivity of high technology exporters
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σ−1 ≡ 11−G(ϕ∗xh)
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(ϕ)σ−1 g(ϕ)dϕ ≡ υϕ∗xh if ϕ > ϕ∗xh (15.B)
Determination of probabilities ρol = 1− ε−k; ρx =
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Using price rule defined in equation 3.B and plugging it into aggregate price index yields
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Labor Market Condition
Plugging firms’ final good demands (1.B) into (18.B) and (19.B), individual demand for skilled
(hxl, hxh) and unskilled labor (lxl, lxh) by exporting firms with low and high technology is:
lxi =
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Exporters have to hire both types of workers to produce for both domestic and foreign markets.
Plugging prices (3.B) into (18.B) and (19.B) and then into aggregate skilled and unskilled labor
demand using (20.B) and (21.B), we obtain the aggregate relative demand for skilled labor (22.B),
which determines the skill premium.
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In the open economy the number of domestic and exporting firms using low technology and its
average productivity is determined by: Nol (ϕ˜l
o)σ−1 = Ndl (ϕ˜dl)σ−1 +Nxl (ϕ˜x)σ−1
[
1 + (1 + τ)1−σ
]
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Proof of Proposition 4: Determination of the open economy equilibrium. Like in
the closed economy equilibrium, LMC (eq. 22.B), FE and ZCP conditions jointly determine the
equilibrium cutoff level. Plugging in the ZCP condition the following variables: ϕ˜dl, ϕ˜xl
o, ϕ˜xh, ρl, ρxl
ρxh and ϕ∗xl, ϕ
∗
xh, we obtain the production cutoff level as a function of the skill premium and the
parameters of the model.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Comparing the productivity cutoff of the open economy ϕ∗dl, as determined in equation 28.B,
to its autarky level ϕ∗l as determined in equation 28.A, we can prove that ϕ
∗
dl > ϕ
∗
l .
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The first term of equation 28.A and 28.B is the same. The third term of equation 28.B cor-
responds to average profits of low technology exporters is positive and superior to the last terms.
Therefore, since the second term of equation 28.B is superior to the second term of equation 28.A,
the productivity cutoff of the open economy (ϕ∗dl) is higher than the productivity cutoff of the
closed economy (ϕ∗l ). 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Average profits of high technology exporters increase with a reduction of trade variable costs.
Partially differenciating ρxh [pidh + pixh] =
ε−k+σ−1fυσ−1[1+(1+τ)1−σ]“
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”σ−1 − ε−kft.with respect to τ taking
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Proof of proposition 7: The impact of trade costs reduction on the aggregate
relative skilled labor demand.
Plugging Nol = ρ
o
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ρxh
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equation 22.B, the aggregate relative skilled labor demand can be expressed as follows:
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Similar to the closed economy equilibrium, under the Pareto distribution of productivity draws
the aggregate relative demand of skilled labor is independent of the productivity cutoff. To deter-
mine whether the aggregate relative skilled labor demand is a decreasing function of variable trade
costs, we partial differenciate H
d
t
Ldt
(τ) with respect to τ .
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Partially differenciating X(τ)with respect to τ
∂X
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Under the partitioning condition,X(τ) is a decreasing function of τ.Indeed the aggregate relative
skilled labor demand is a decreasing function of trade variable costs :
∂(HL )
d
∂τ < 0. Since the relative
skilled labor supply is fixed, a reduction in variable trade costs will push up the aggregate relative
skilled labor demand and hence raise the skill premium. ∂ω∂τ < 0.
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Case 1: The impact of trade liberalization 
Graph 1: The net effect of a reduction of Ĳ on the production cutoff 
ĳdl*
0.22 0.4 0.6 0.8
   2.00 
 1.91
 1.88
Ĳ
“Foreign competition effect” dominates over the “skill premium effect”: the least productive firms 
exit the market. 
Graph 2: 
The net effect of a reduction of Ĳ on the extensive margin of technology 
ĳxh*
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
?
?
3.91
3.40
3.73
Ĳ
“Extensive margin of technology”: a reduction of trade frictions increases market shares and profits 
of all exporters allowing new firms to adopt high technology. The increase in export profitability 
compensates the negative impact of the raise in the skill premium on the technology adoption decision. 
Partitioning condition: 
Parameters values:  These results remain robust for different parameters values well 
established in the literature: I  (Bernard et al., 2004);D 0.5/0.6 (Acemoglu ,2002); k
=3,4/5. Following Bernard, Redding and Schott (2004): fe=1/2; f=0,1/0,2; Gfx=0,2/0,3 and 
Gft=0,9/1,25; ah = 2/3.
22
In order to find the equilibrium value of the skill premium, I used the FindRoot command of Matematica which uses a root-finding algorithm.
The results remain robust for different parameters values well established in the literature.
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9 Appendix 4: Empirical results
Table 1: Prediction 1: The determinants of technology choice. DV: Foreign
Technology (FTA) 0/1. Subsample of Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Linear Linear
model model probability probability
TFP(t-1) 0.400*** 0.272* 0.030*** 0.010*
(0.094) (0.151) (0.007) (0.006)
Size(t-1) 0.753*** 0.291 0.068*** 0.010
(0.076) (0.265) (0.008) (0.011)
Capital Intensity(t-1) 0.264*** -0.049 0.021*** -0.003
(0.064) (0.150) (0.005) (0.007)
credit(t-1) 0.376** 0.136 0.022* 0.006
(0.148) (0.215) (0.012) (0.010)
FDI(t-1) 0.687*** 0.251 0.102*** 0.015
(0.220) (0.367) (0.033) (0.021)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes no yes no
Plant fixed effects no yes no yes
Number of Obs 7379 1750 7465 7465
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.133 0.008
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by firm.
The intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 2: Prediction 1: Robustness checks. Alternative measures of technology.
Subsample of Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Patent Patent Investment Investment
use use in new machinery in new machinery
Logit Linear Logit Linear
model probability model probability
TFP(t-1) 0.263** 0.021** 0.359*** 0.045***
(0.115) (0.009) (0.091) (0.011)
Capital intensity(t-1) 0.133 0.008
(0.117) (0.009)
Size(t-1) 0.521*** 0.046*** 0.483*** 0.068***
(0.201) (0.017) (0.144) (0.019)
Credit(t-1) 0.380** 0.037** 0.205 0.026
(0.157) (0.015) (0.137) (0.017)
FDI(t-1) -0.448 -0.029* 0.281 0.025
(0.300) (0.016) (0.353) (0.027)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Plant fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 2171 7465 3906 7465
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.006 0.014
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by firm. The intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3: Prediction 2: Changes in skill upgrading by export and technology
status. DV: Skilled over unskilled labor (1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D.exporter TECH 0.106** 0.108** 0.103** 0.104** 0.096**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
D.exporter only 0.032* 0.033* 0.032* 0.032* 0.031
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
D.TECH non exporter 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036)
D.TFP 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.088***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
D.capital intensity 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.120***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
D.Credit 0.042** 0.042** 0.034*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
D.FDI 0.038 0.039
(0.032) (0.036)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes yes no
Plant fixed effects no no no no yes
Number of Obs 18247 18247 18247 18247 18247
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.012 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.022
Note: Huber White Standard errors. In column 4-5 errors are clustered by firm.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4: Robustness checks: Prediction 2. DV: Skilled over unskilled labor
(1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Never exporters Exporters Full sample Never exporters Exporters
D.Patent Ind 0.042** 0.036* 0.060* 0.043** 0.033 0.068**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.034)
D.TFP 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.097***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031)
D.Capital intensity 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.157*** 0.120*** 0.099*** 0.153***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.030)
D.credit 0.042** 0.040* 0.042 0.033* 0.029 0.038
(0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030)
D.FDI 0.037 -0.007 0.069 0.038 -0.014 0.081
(0.032) (0.041) (0.046) (0.036) (0.045) (0.053)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes no no no
Plant fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Number of Obs 18247 12051 6196 18247 12051 6196
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.020 0.015 0.029 0.023 0.019 0.031
Note: Huber White Standard errors. In column 4-5 errors are clustered by firm.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Robustness checks : Prediction 2. DV: Skilled over unskilled labor
(1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Never exporters Exporters Full sample Never exporters Exporters
D.Investment new machinery 0.007 -0.004 0.036* 0.012 0.002 0.037*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.021)
D.TFP 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.088***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.018) (0.023) (0.031)
D.Credit 0.042** 0.041* 0.041 0.034* 0.030 0.039
(0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030)
D.FDI 0.037 -0.005 0.066 0.037 -0.010 0.073
(0.032) (0.041) (0.047) (0.036) (0.046) (0.053)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes no no no
Plant fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Number of Obs 18247 12051 6196 18247 12051 6196
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.017
Note: Huber White Standard errors. In column 4-5 errors are clustered by firm.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 6: Prediction 3: The impact of trade liberalization on technology choice.
DV: Technology indicator 0/1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Exporters
change in TX(t-1) -0.191** -0.188** -0.189** -0.189** -0.537**
(0.085) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.263)
TFP(t-1) 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.024)
Size(t-1) 0.021 0.022 0.022 -0.024
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.043)
FDI(t-1) -0.016 -0.016 -0.028
(0.024) (0.024) (0.054)
Credit(t-1) -0.006 0.028
(0.016) (0.042)
constant 0.299*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 0.769***
(0.014) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.220)
Time Ind yes yes yes yes yes
Plant fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 12281 10461 10461 10461 1755
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012
Note: Huber White Standard errors. In column 5 errors are clustered by firm.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 7: Robustness checks. Prediction 3: The impact of trade liberalization
on technology spending. DV: Log of Technology Spending (1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TX(t-1) 0.437* 0.341 0.172 0.164 0.155
(0.233) (0.242) (0.221) (0.221) (0.219)
Always*TX(t-1) -0.933*** -0.840*** -0.767*** -0.732*** -0.741***
(0.252) (0.282) (0.276) (0.278) (0.270)
Starter*TX(t-1) -0.205 -0.262 -0.476 -0.477 -0.557*
(0.288) (0.332) (0.316) (0.315) (0.303)
Switcher*TX(t-1) -0.078 -0.257 -0.242 -0.235 -0.184
(0.255) (0.273) (0.256) (0.255) (0.255)
Stopper*TX(t-1) -0.603 -0.724 -0.698* -0.692* -0.725*
(0.406) (0.463) (0.401) (0.404) (0.408)
Always 3.962*** 3.656*** 3.122*** 3.019*** 2.948***
(0.574) (0.650) (0.636) (0.642) (0.620)
Starter 1.845*** 1.956*** 2.233*** 2.222*** 2.333***
(0.638) (0.751) (0.712) (0.709) (0.681)
Switcher 1.119* 1.373** 1.174** 1.149* 0.961
(0.581) (0.631) (0.591) (0.590) (0.587)
Stopper 2.727*** 2.800** 2.466*** 2.444*** 2.405**
(0.947) (1.091) (0.933) (0.941) (0.952)
Initial TFP 0.629*** 0.721*** 0.712*** 0.693***
(0.080) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075)
Initial Capital intensity 0.459*** 0.451*** 0.433***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
FDI(t-1) 0.314** 0.328**
(0.158) (0.158)
Credit(t-1) 0.535***
(0.096)
Constant 8.742*** 5.097*** 1.949** 2.017** 2.050***
(0.584) (0.795) (0.787) (0.790) (0.768)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 5811 4370 4370 4370 4370
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.166 0.200 0.264 0.265 0.278
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 8: Prediction 4: The impact of trade liberalization on the relative de-
mand of skilled labor. DV: skilled over unskilled labor (1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Exporters high technology
change in TX -0.642** -0.662** -0.668** -0.658** -2.479**
(0.308) (0.307) (0.307) (0.318) (1.138)
D.TFP(t-1) 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.006
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.051)
D.Capital intensity 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.129**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.050)
D.FDI 0.060* 0.060 0.061
(0.035) (0.038) (0.073)
D.credit 0.054*** 0.034
(0.019) (0.045)
constant 0.094** 0.080** 0.080** 0.081** -0.117
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.133)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 15421 15421 15421 15421 1440
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.014 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.019
Note: Huber White Standard errors. In columns 3, 4, 5 errors are clustered by firm.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 9: Robustness checks. Prediction 4: The impact of trade liberalization
on on the relative demand of skilled labor. DV: skilled over unskilled labor
(1990-1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TX(t-1) 0.065 0.108** 0.106** 0.108** 0.103**
(0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Always*TX(t-1) -0.285*** -0.246*** -0.228** -0.249*** -0.239***
(0.081) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.091)
Starter*TX(t-1) -0.157 0.010 0.010 -0.045 -0.067
(0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.102) (0.101)
Switcher*TX(t-1) -0.014 -0.119 -0.116 -0.114 -0.103
(0.079) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086)
Stopper*TX(t-1) -0.129 -0.150 -0.145 -0.182 -0.188
(0.144) (0.158) (0.157) (0.155) (0.154)
Always 0.655*** 0.511** 0.455** 0.380* 0.309
(0.193) (0.225) (0.227) (0.223) (0.219)
Starter 0.409* -0.039 -0.044 -0.003 0.006
(0.238) (0.239) (0.237) (0.231) (0.231)
Switcher 0.104 0.260 0.249 0.185 0.121
(0.176) (0.196) (0.196) (0.194) (0.194)
Stopper 0.271 0.268 0.252 0.250 0.222
(0.321) (0.368) (0.368) (0.365) (0.364)
Initial TFP 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.173*** 0.160***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
FDI(t-1) 0.169** 0.117* 0.120*
(0.069) (0.067) (0.066)
Initial Capital Intensity 0.099*** 0.089***
(0.011) (0.011)
Credit(t-1) 0.214***
(0.027)
constant -0.772*** -1.748*** -1.741*** -2.437*** -2.339***
(0.136) (0.201) (0.199) (0.211) (0.211)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry isic-3 Ind yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 22900 15724 15724 15724 15724
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.114 0.130 0.131 0.146 0.155
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 10: Variables description
[Variable] [Data]
Employment Size Total labour
Skilled labor H Non production workers: employees paid by
commissions, administrative stuff, subcontract
employees and other non production employees.
Unskilled labor L Production workers
Relative skilled labor demand H/L Non production over production workers
Wage rate of skilled labor Wh Wages paid to non production workers over
the number of non production workers hired
Wage rate of unskilled labor Wl Wages paid to production workers over the
number of production workers hired
Capital intensity K/L Capital stock over total workers
Foreign Technology (FTA) TECH Dummy variable equals to one if the plant reports
expenditures on Foreign Technological Assistance
Patent Indicator Patent Ind Dummy variable equals to one if the plant reports
patents use and rights
Investment in new machinery Investment indicator Dummy variable equals to one if the plant reports
expenditures on new machinery
Total factor productivity TFP Total factor productivity estimated using Levinsohn and
Petrin methodology in Bas and Ledezma (2007)
Financial Indicator Credit Dummy variable equals to one if the plant reports
having paid a loan tax in year ”‘t”’
Foreign Direct Investment FDI indicator Dummy variable equal to one if the firm
has more than 50% of foreign capital
Continuing exporters Always Dummy variable equal to one if the firm
exports during the whole period
New exporters Starter Dummy variable equal to one if the firm does not export
at the beginning of the period and starts exporting afterwards
Stop exporting Stopper Dummy variable equal to one if the firm exports at
the beginning of the period and stops exporting afterwards
Switchers Switcher Dummy variable equal to one if the firm enters and exits
the foreign market more than once
Export barrier TX Average import tariffs set by the main trade
parterns to Chilean exports at 3 dig industry level.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics by Export Status (1990-1999)
[Exporters] [Non Exporters]
Number of Firms 31% (1196) 69% (2704)
Always 12%
Starter 7%
Stopper 3%
Switcher 9%
Size %
Large (more 150 workers) 40% 6%
Medium (50-149 workers) 36% 20%
Small (10-49 workers) 24% 74%
TFP (Mean) 2740 (176) 1149 (23)
Employment (Mean) 202 (4) 55 (0.61)
Skill intensity (Mean) 0.30 (0.003) 0.25 (0.001)
Capital Intensity (Mean) 7838 (225) 2593 (46)
FTA (%) 14% 2.5%
Patent use (%) 85% 78%
Investment in new machinery (%) 77% 47%
Import share of inputs expenditure (%) 53% 11%
Type of Ownership FDI 11% 1%
Note: Standard errors of means are reported in parentheses.
Table 12: Exporter Premia: TFP by export status. Dependant variable: TFP
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Always 0.429*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.282*** 0.208***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Starter 0.284*** 0.208*** 0.190*** 0.176*** 0.109**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Switcher 0.258*** 0.200*** 0.187*** 0.173*** 0.133***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Stopper 0.128* 0.043 -0.001 -0.014 -0.049
(0.068) (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071)
Initial employment 0.089*** 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
FDI(t-1) 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.140**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
Credit (t-1) 0.112*** 0.075***
(0.021) (0.021)
TECH Ind 0.313***
(0.025)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry isic-3 Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 25990 25990 18588 18588 18588
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.367 0.372 0.397 0.400 0.415
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses
Note: The coefficient of the intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 13: Decomposition of Relative Demand of Skilled labor (H/L)
[Total] [Between] [Within] [Within/Total]
1979-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,079 -0,014 0,093 1,182
Industries at 3 digit 0,202 -0,005 0,206 1,023
Firms 0,227 0,068 0,158 0,697
1979-1986
Industries at 2 digit 0,377 0,110 0,267 0,708
Industries at 3 digit 0,238 -0,033 0,272 1,140
Firms 0,317 0,173 0,143 0,452
1990-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,056 0,001 0,055 0,983
Industries at 3 digit 0,068 0,002 0,066 0,969
Firms 0,044 -0,083 0,127 2,846
Table 14: Decomposition of Relative Skilled Wage
[Total] [Between] [Within] [Within/Total]
1979-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,014 -0,008 0,022 1,549
Industries at 3 digit 0,324 0,041 0,283 0,873
Firms 1,518 0,464 1,054 0,694
1979-1986
Industries at 2 digit 0,127 0,002 0,124 0,980
Industries at 3 digit 0,518 -0,010 0,528 1,020
Firms 0,752 0,339 0,412 0,548
1990-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,157 -0,038 0,195 1,245
Industries at 3 digit 0,563 -0,295 0,858 1,524
Firms 0,639 0,100 0,539 0,843
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